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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OREM CITY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 9400318-CA

CHRISTOPHER J. SOLOMON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred by Section 78-2a-3(f), U.C.A.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court err in concluding that Defendant

was given a sufficient warning of the consequences of allowing a
blood draw to satisfy constitutional and statutory requirements?
The standard of review as to a lower court's
determination of the interpretation of a statute as
it relates to the admission of evidence is that an
appellate court accords the lower court's
interpretation no particular deference but assesses
it for correctness as any other conclusion of law.
Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah
1990).
The lower court ruled as to this issue on page
27 of the Motion to Suppress Hearing dated April 14,
1994.
2.

Did the lower court err in ruling that Defendant had

knowingly consented to a blood draw?
Findings of Fact supporting a trial court's
decision on a Motion to Suppress are reviewed under
the "clearly erroneous" standard of Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure 52A. State v. Hargraves, 806
P.2d 228, 231 (Utah App. 1991).
-1-

The lower court ruled that the government had
reasonable grounds to believe that it had obtained
Defendant's consent on page 37 of the suppression
hearing dated April 14, 1994.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution..."No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution..."Every
person shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures."
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12, "The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself."
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14, "A person shall
be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures."
Section 41-6-44.10:
1(a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state
is considered to have given his consent to a chemical
test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, for the
purpose of determining whether he was operating or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while
having a blood or alcohol content statutorily
prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4 while
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
combination of alcohol in any drug under Section
41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in
the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6,
if the test is or tests are administered at the
direction of a peace officer having grounds to
believe that person to have been operating or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily
prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4....
2(a) If a person has been placed under arrest, has
then been requested by a peace officer to submit to
any one or more of the chemical tests under
subsection 1, and refuses to submit to any chemical
test requested, the person shall be warned by the
peace officer requesting the test or tests that a
refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in
revocation of the person's license to operate a motor
vehicle.
-2-

(b) Following the warning under subsection (a), if
the person does not immediately request that the
chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer
be administered a peace officer shall serve on the
person, on behalf of the Driver's License Division,
immediate notice of the Driver's License Division to
revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a
motor vehicle....
* * *

8. If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a
chemical test or tests under the provisions of this
section, evidence of refusal shall be admissible in
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising
out of acts alleged to have been committed while the
person was driving or in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug.
Section 53-3-223, U.C.A.:
1(a). If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to
believe that a person may be violating or has
violated Section 41-6-44, prohibiting the operation
of a vehicle with a certain blood or breath alcohol
concentration and driving under the influence of any
drug, alcohol, or combination of a drug and alcohol
or while having any measurable controlled substance
or metabolite of a controlled substance in the
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, the
peace officer may, in connection with arresting the
person, request that the person submit to a chemical
test or tests to be administered in compliance with
the standards under Section 41-6-44.10.
* * *

2. The peace officer shall advise a person prior to
the person's submissiion to a chemical test that a
test result indicating a violation of Section 41-6-44
or 41-6-44.6 shall, and the existence of a blood
alcohol content sufficient to render the person
incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle may,
result in suspension or revocation of the person's
license to drive a motor vehicle.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the denial by the lower court of
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Defendant's Motion to Suppress the evidence of the blood alcohol
content of a test administered to Defendant while he was
hospitalized after an accident and his subsequent conviction
based on the blood sample.
Course of Proceedings
A Motion to Suppress was held on April 14, 1994 before the
Honorable Joseph Dimick.
defendant testified.
to Suppress.

The arresting officer as well as the

The lower court denied Defendant's Motion

The Defendant was convicted on April 25, 1994 of

driving while intoxicated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant Christopher Solomon was involved in an
automobile accident on January 24, 1994.

Officer Scott Newrem

of the Orem City Police investigated the accident.

He found Mr.

Solomon seated in the driver's seat of the defendant's Celica.
He was bleeding from a couple of wounds on his face.
(Suppression Hearing, April 14, 1994, pp.
Suppression Hearing).

4-5; hereinafter

He testified that he smelled a strong

odor of alcoholic beverage in the vehicle.

(Id. at 5 ) .

He stated that when he arrived at the hospital he also
smelled a strong odor of alcoholic beverage.

While at the

hospital he informed the defendant that he was being arrested
for driving under the influence of alcohol.

(Id. at 6 ) . The

officer did not give the defendant any type of field test
because he did not feel he was able to perform them safely.
(Id. at 8 ) .
Because the officer did not have a DUI report form with him
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he attempted to explain Utah's implied consent law from memory.
(Id. at 8 ) . He told the defendant:
Basically the same as they're written in the
admonition on the back of the report form, that he
does have the right to refuse, if he does this, his
license can be revoked for one year without a
provision for a limited license. That a result
indicating .08 or greater could result in the denial
of his license for three months. (Id. at 9 ) .
The officer stated that he understood that the defendant
was fairly deaf but that he felt he was able to communicate with
him if he spoke directly to him so that the defendant could read
his lips.

(Id.).

At that time he handed the defendant a

"consent form" which stated, "I have granted permission for
blood samples to be taken." This was signed by the defendant in
the officer's presence.

(Id. at 10). After this form was

signed, he watched a registered nurse draw blood from the
defendant.
On cross examination the officer admitted that he wrote
down in his report that the defendant was "mute" and not "deaf".
The officer testified he used this word because it was the only
one he could think of to "demonstrate that he was a — h e had a
problem communicating or understanding." (Id. at 13). Defense
counsel asked the following question which was answered by the
officer:
Q. So it was your perception the next day that Mr.
Solomon's main problem was communicating with
speech?
A. I think there was, yeah, there was a definite
communication problem. (Id. at 13).
The officer stated that he commonly read what is known as
the "Refusal Admonition" to everyone whether they refused or
-5-

not.

The officer testified that after he gave the warning the

best he could, that Mr. Solomon indicated it was okay to take
the test by making a verbal response like "okay" and shaking his
head yes.

(Id. at 16).

The defendant Christopher Solomon testified that while he
was at the hospital, he did not understand anything that the
officer was telling him.

(Id. at 40}.

As to the signed card he

stated, "I thought it was some type of form that the nurse
needed to draw blood for typing, testing, whatever." He stated
that, "I had no idea what the blood samples were going to be
used for." (Id. at 43). He stated that the form was handed to
him by the nurse and not by the officer.

(Id.).

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the lower
court denied Defendant's motions on all grounds and allowed the
blood evidence to be admitted into trial.
On April 25, 1994 the Court found the defendant guilty of
driving while intoxicated based upon the results of the blood
draw.

The Court fined the defendant $1,000 and six months in

jail but stayed imposition pending appeal and further review.
On May 19, 1994 this appeal was taken from the April 14,
1994 Suppression Hearing and the Judgment of April 25, 1994.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

It is the contention of the defendant that the lower

court erred in failing to suppress the evidence of the blood
alcohol test obtained from the defendant while in the hospital.
It is defendant's contention that he was not sufficiently warned
under existing Utah criminal law and civil law as to the
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
DEFENDANT WAS GIVEN A SUFFICIENT WARNING
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for

OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALLOWING A BLOOD
DRAW TO SATISFY CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS.
The present maze of drunk driving laws in Utah present a
confusing and often unintelligible path of civil and criminal
procedure.

Under the present statutory situation, it is a crime

punishable by fine and imprisonment to drive while intoxicated
in Utah.

An additional punishment under the criminal law upon

conviction can be the removal of a defendant's driving license
for a specified period of time.
Concurrently with the criminal case, a civil case also
develops.

With this statutory scheme, a driver who is

determined by an administrative law judge to have been incapable
of safely operating a vehicle or whose blood alcohol content was
.08 or greater, also will lose their license for a specified
period of time depending upon their prior record.

If a

defendant refuses to take a breath test then the civil law
provides that the driver will automatically lose his license for
a specified period of time regardless of whether he was actually
intoxicated or not and regardless of the outcome of the criminal
case.
This dual system of criminal and civil procedure is not
only confusing to lawyers, judges, and other officials working
in the system each day, but certainly to drivers who are stopped
and confronted with accusations of unlawful intoxication.

As

such, therefore, it is imperative that accused drivers are given
every opportunity to understand the consequences of their
actions or inaction in both the criminal and civil proceedings.
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interrogated a person must be informed that _<_ has the right to

remain silent and that any statements made may be used against
him.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Thus, when the criminal context of a DUI is analyzed, the

defendant may refuse to give any incriminating evidence against
himself as to the condition of his alleged alcoholic
intoxication.

In order to obtain a blood sample against a

suspected drunk driver, the officer must either obtain the
consent of the driver or obtain a warrant from a court
permitting an involuntary blood draw.
U.S. 291 (1973).

Cupp v. Murphy, 412

Since there was clearly no attempt to obtain

a warrant in this case, the state relied upon the argument that
the defendant voluntarily consented to the blood draw and
therefore that the evidence obtained was proper.

Defendant

contends that the factual evidence existing in the record does
not support the state's argument and that the lower court erred
in finding that a voluntary consent had occurred.

This issue

will be discussed infra in Point II of this Brief.
In the criminal context of this case it is Defendant's
contetion that he should have been given the Miranda warning,
which he was not, and that furthermore, he should have been
given a warning that if he submitted to a blood draw and if the
blood draw showed an alcoholic content of .08 and above, that
such evidence could be used to convict him under the criminal
statute and subject him to imprisonment and a fine.
Furthermore, due process required that if he chose to refuse to
take such a blood draw that he should be warned that such
refusal itself could be used against him in a criminal
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DUI scheme and do not address the problem involved in failing to
give warnings on the criminal side.
Defendant contends that even if it is assumed that the
officer in this case correctly informed him that he could have
his license suspended if a .08 or greater alcohol content was
discovered, and that he would have his license suspended if he
refused to take the appropriate tests, such warning by itself is
insufficient to allow the blood test into evidence on the
criminal side of the matter.
The Supreme Court of Utah stated that after a person is
arrested he is then compelled to elect whether he will submit to
a chemical test or lose his license.
P.2d 307, 309 (1968).

State v. Cruz, 446

While this is a correct statement as to

the civil liability of license suspension, it is incomplete as
to the criminal counterpart.

As stated in Holman, supra,

an explanation must give the defendant a fair opportunity to
make meaningful decisions based upon a sufficient explanation of
rights and duties.
In the instant case, the evidence is insufficient, as a
matter of law, to show that defendant was properly warned in the
criminal context.

Defendant should have been given a Miranda

warning at the time of his arrest in the hospital.

At that

point, he should also have been informed that if he consented to
a blood draw that such evidence could be used to suspend his
license and could be used in a criminal conviction.
Furthermore, he should have been informed that if he elected to
refuse to give such a test, he would probably lose his license
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given"; (2) that consent was given without duress or coercion,
express or implied; and (3) because the courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights, there must be convincing evidence that
such rights were waived.

Id. at 127.

If the defendant refused to consent to a blood draw, there
is no question that he could have lost his license under the
civil scheme of Utah law.

However, absent the obtaining of a

warrant, the officer could not have drawn the blood against the
defendant's will.

As such, therefore, in order for this

evidence to be admissible in a criminal prosecution, it must be
shown that the defendant voluntarily consented to the blood draw
in spite of any consequences on the civil side.
The evidence is undisputed that the defendant had a severe
hearing problem and in fact could be classified as deaf.

The

officer himself stated that there was a severe communication
problem between them and that he assumed if he spoke to the
defendant directly, he could read his lips.

There was no

evidence showing that the defendant had the ability to read the
officer's lips or that the officer's assumption was reasonable
at the time of the arrest and request for blood draw in light of
defendant's hospitalization.

The defendant was not shown any

written documents as is normally the case in a DUI arrest where
the warnings and various other information is contained in the
DUI forms.

The officer, in fact, had to rely upon his own

memory to give the civil warnings to the defendant.

The consent

form for the blood draw did not state it would be used in any
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criminal or civil proceeding, but was in fact the type of form
that would be used by any hospital for any blood draw for any
reason.
The testimony of the defendant was that he did not
understand what was being told to him by the officer because he
was unable to hear him clearly and that he believed the form he
signed was one to help him in his treatment for the injuries of
the accident.

Both the officer's testimony and that of

Defendant is at best a showing of no consent and at worst a
showing of confusion and ambiguity.

The lower court was

required to objectively view the evidence to determine if a
voluntary consent had been made by Defendant in light of these
circumstances.
The Utah Supreme Court in Muir v. Cox, 611 P.2d 384
(Utah 1980), in a concurring opinion by Justice Stewart, stated
the standard to be applied in determining whether an officer had
properly given the statutory warnings under the civil statutes
justifying the suspension of a license.

The Court stated:

When there is apparent confusion arising from a
failure of an arrestee to understand the demand for a
blood test and the rights accorded under a Miranda
warning, the officer must give a clear explanation of
the duties and rights of the arrestee. An officer
properly discharges his duty if he gives an
explanation that a person of reasonable intelligence,
who is in command of his senses, would understand.
Id. at 386.
But in the instant case, the defendant was not "in command
of his senses" in that he could not hear as a normal person
could." It was incumbent upon the state to show that it had gone
to extreme measures to insure that the defendant understood what
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rights and liabilities were involved with the consent that was
being requested.
The lower court ruled that "the government thought they had
actual consent." (Suppression Hearing, 37). The Court
misconstrued the burden.

The question was whether or not

viewing the evidence in its totality it could be said that the
defendant understood the consent that he was asked to give; not
whether the officer believed the defendant understood.
To allow such a ruling to stand would negate the
effort required by law enforcement officials to clearly make
sure that a defendant understands the request for consent.

When

a person has been involved in an accident, is old, or otherwise
has a handicap, it is incumbent upon the government to show that
a reasonable person with similar handicaps would have understood
the warnings and would have voluntarily given such consent.

It

is immaterial what the officer believed of the defendant's
understanding at the time the request was being made.

This is a

question of consent—not probable cause.
For these reasons, therefore, even if it is assumed that
the warnings were properly given to the defendant, the lower
court erred in factually finding that the defendant had
voluntarily consented to the blood draw.

Therefore, the

evidence of such draw should have been excluded by the lower
court.
CONCLUSION
The creation of a civil statutory scheme by the legislature
to suspend licenses of potentially dangerous drivers is
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legitimate.

However, this civil system is not a substitute for

the protection given to all criminal defendants under the state
and federal constitutions.

Defendant was entitled to a clear

explanation and warning under the criminal system if he was to
be able to make an intelligent decision concerning testing of
his blood.

The police failed to properly inform defendant

before the blood draw and therefore its results must be
suppressed.
The question of voluntary consent to the blood draw was
distorted by the trial court.

This was not a probable cause

hearing to determine if the officer reasonably believed
defendant had given his consent for the blood draw.

Instead,

the focus should have been on the objective state of mind of the
defendant at the time he was requested to consent to the draw.
Would a reasonable person in defendant's circumstances have
voluntarily given their consent or would the hearing impairment,
lack of written documentation and use of ambiguous hospital
forms prevented any consent from being voluntary and knowing?
Under both of the above arguments, the Court erred in
failing to suppress the blood test results.

The matter should

be reversed and remanded.
DATED this 27th day of February, 1995.

3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
LARRY LONG
225 North State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to Ed Berkovich, Orem City Prosecutor, 56 North
State, Orem, Utah 84057, and Larry Long, 225 North State Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103-4615 this 27th day of February, 1995,

-18-

ADDENDUM

Orem Dept. - 4th Circuit Court
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF OREM CITY
VS
SOLOMON, CHRISTOPHER
663 E 485 S
OREM
UT

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

84058

CASE NO:
DOB
TAPE .
DATE
CITATION

945000780
02/09/57
94195 COUNT
04/29/94

184

/

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 41-6-44 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS
Plea: Not Guilty
Find: Guilty - Bench
Fine:
1000.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail: 180 DA
Susp:
0
ACS:
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS:
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
Fine Description: Surcharge - 85%
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS:
Credit:
0.00 Paid:

0.00

Due:

540.55

0.00

Due:

459.45

0.00

Due:

1,000.00

SOLOMON, CHRISTOPHER

CASE NO: 945000780

PAGE

DOCKET INFORMATION:
Sentence:
Deft present with Counsel, Prosecutor present
ATD: LONG, LARRY N.
PRO: BERKOVICH, EDWARD
Tape: 94195
Count: 184
Judge: Joseph I. Dimick
Chrg: DUI
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Be
Fine Amount:
1000.00
Suspended:
.00
Jail:
180 DAYS
Suspended:
ALL PARTIES PRESENT. FINE OF $1000 AND 6 MONTHS JAIL ALL STAYED
PENDING REVIEW ON JUNE 6, 1S94 AT 10:00 A.M.

BY THE COURTS

5GE, 'CIRCUIT COURT
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 3 0 DAYS'.'-..,
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT.
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